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Abstract 
 
Long term care (LTC) is mainly provided by the family and subsidiarily by the market and the 
government. To understand the role of these three institutions it is important to understand the 
motives and the working of family solidarity. In this paper we focus on the case when LTC is 
provided by children to their dependent parents out of some norm that has been inculcated to 
them during their childhood by some exemplary behavior of their parents towards their own 
parents. In the first part, we look at the interaction between the family and the market in providing 
for LTC. The key parameters are the probability of dependence, the probability of having a norm-
abiding child and the loading factor. In the second part, we introduce the government which has a 
double mission: correct for a prevailing externality and redistribute resources across 
heterogeneous households. 
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1 Introduction
It is widely agreed upon that our societies face a serious problem with
long term care (LTC). Defined as a mix of medical and support services for
those with disabilities and chronic care needs, LTC can be delivered at home,
in an adult day care center or through another type of community program,
in an assisted living facility, or in a nursing home. The source of the problem
is twofold, demographic and societal. On the one hand, one witnesses a rapid
increase of people aged 80+. Their relative importance in EU27 will go from
4.41% in 2008 to 12.13% in 2060. The highest figures concern Italy: 5.50
and 14.91. (Source: Eurostat, EUROPOP2008 convergence scenario). The
issue of dependency arises precisely in that age bracket. On the other hand,
with the drastic change in family values, the increasing number of childless
households and the mobility of children, the number of dependent elderly
who cannot count on the assistance of anyone is increasing. Those two par-
allel evolutions explain why there is a mounting demand on the government
and the market to provide alternatives to the family.
LTC is the nexus of intense and complex interactions among three in-
stitutions: the state, the market and naturally the family.1 An important
empirical work particularly in the US has been devoted to the crowding out
effect that social assistance can have on either the market or the family. An-
swer to these questions depends closely on the nature of family solidarity. Is
it is based on pure altruism from children to dependent parents?2 Does it
rely on some sort of market or strategic exchange between the parents and
the children as presented by Kottlikof and Spitvak (1981) or Bernheim et al.
(1985)?3 Or does it depend on some sort of social norm that comes from
prevailing culture or from parental education? Those three sources of family
solidarity are likely to coexist. They have to be well understood to grasp the
role of the market in LTC and to design optimal policies.
1Brown and Finkelstein (2004a,b), Brown et al. (2006), Finkelstein and McGarry,
(2004, 2005).
2Pestieau and Sato. (2006, 2008), Jousten et al. (2005).
3There exist a number of papers studying exchanges within the family. See, e.g., Stern
and Engers (2002). For a survey, see Norton (2000).
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We consider a framework where children can assist parents but this entails
a cost. This cost is incurred ex ante, before the degree of disability of the
parents has been revealed. One can think of irreversible occupational or
residential choices. For instance, children might buy a house close to their
parents, or pursue certain studies or carrier paths allowing them to assist
parents if needed. All these investment decisions are taken before the degree
of disability has been known. If parents turn out to be independent in their
old age, the investment in family help made by the children is unproductive.
In this paper we focus on the idea that children’s assistance to dependent
parents is motivated by a family norm that is inculcated to them by the ex-
ample of giving behavior that their parents give them during their childhood
as modeled by Cox and Stark (1993, 2005) under the concept of demonstra-
tion effect. Accordingly parents make transfers to their own parents when
children are present to observe such transfers. This in return conditions their
own behavior when their parents age. The conjecture that the parents’ be-
havior is aimed at inculcating desirable behavior in their children generates
testable hypotheses about transfers that have been investigated by these au-
thors using household survey microdata. We use this idea for the issue of
LTC, but with an important difference, as the need for LTC is uncertain: it
occurs only in case of loss of autonomy. As a consequence, the demonstration
behavior turns out to be a sunk cost if the individual does not need LTC in
his old days.
As it will appear presently, an individual has three ways of covering for
LTC needs. First, he can hope to get some aid from his child. The amount
of this aid will depend on the demonstration effect but also on the chance
of having a traditional child. In other words, investing in demonstration
is twice risky: it is only operative if the individual turns dependent and if
his child happens to be traditional. The second way is through the private
insurance market. The plus of insurance is that it is targeted on the state of
dependence; its minuses are the prevalence of loading costs and the fact that
it does not provide the same quality of LTC service as the family. The third
way is traditional saving, that is saving for retirement. If the loading costs
are prohibitive, the individual can choose to self-insure instead of buying
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some LTC insurance.
The paper is both positive and normative. In a first stage we want to
understand the interplay between the market and the family. We there show
that the level of family solidarity depends positively of the probability of
dependency, the probability of having a traditional child, that is a child who
abides to the family norm, and to the level of the insurance loading cost.
Conversely, the insurance market size will be higher if the probability of
having a traditional child is high and if the loading factor is low.
We also show that the market outcome is not optimal even in the case of
identical individuals because in their choice of investment individuals only
partially internalize the benefit of this investment for their elderly parents.
This creates an externality that can be corrected by a Pigouvian tax on labor.
In addition to this, if the private insurance is not actuarially fair, individuals
might overinvest in family help. In such a case, public LTC insurance can
be a useful instrument for the social planner. We show that the optimal
public insurance has to trade-off the insurance motive and the correction for
the family norm externality. For instance, if family help is discouraged by
the introduction of a public LTC insurance, the social planner might provide
less than full insurance in order to enhance the family norm. Introducing
heterogeneous individuals with uneven incomes brings another role for the
government: it is to correct for the above externality but also to transfer
resources from high to low income households. We characterize the optimal
tax schedule when the social planner can use a linear income tax, and a
flat-benefit public LTC insurance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe
the model of family norm and the equilibrium allocation. In Section 3 we
analyze the optimal allocation when all individuals in the population have
the same productivity. We also discuss the role of a linear income tax and of
a public health insurance. In Section 4 we consider the case when individuals
differ in productivity. In Section 5 we conclude.
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2 A model of family norm
We consider an overlapping generations model in which people live two
periods. The first period corresponds to young age: each individual has
one child, allocates time between family help and work, and allocates in-
come across consumption, savings and long-term care insurance. The sec-
ond period corresponds to old age: the individual consumes his savings.
Furthermore, with probability pi, the individual is dependent. In this case,
he receives family help and the LTC insurance compensation.
To analyze the transmission of the family norm, we assume that parents
can shape the preferences of their children through demonstration. This
modeling strategy was first proposed by Stark (1995), who also found empir-
ical evidence of the existence of such a demonstration effect (Cox and Stark,
1993, 2005).
An individual active in time t belongs to generation t. At the beginning
of period t, before the dependency status of the parent has realized, the
individual sets the family norm γt. This variable can be interpreted as an
irreversible investment in the family that will be operative only if the parent
turns out to be disabled. For instance, children might choose jobs and sectors
that do not require too much traveling, or to move far away. They might
also choose an education leading to careers which are compatible with family
help. All these decisions limit the career prospects of children. Under this
interpretation, γt is a parameter reducing individual productivity and wage,
w. With probability pi the parent is dependent and the investment in γt is
productive. With probability (1− pi), this investment does not increase the
utility of the parent. However, it still works as a demonstration device for
children.
With probability pi, a parent is dependent and receives from his child
a transfer µ(γt+1), where µ(.) is a strictly increasing and concave function
representing how valuable is children’s help for dependent parents. This
translates the idea that the nature of the transfer is not just monetary.
Let us define ρ as the probability that a child conforms to the previous
behavior of his parent by setting the same rate of intrafamily transfer, γt.
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We will call this child a traditionalist. With probability (1− ρ) the child is
modern, and is not influenced by tradition. He chooses the investment that
maximizes his own expected utility. For this type, the quantity γt+1 is set
optimally and does not depend on γt. The utility function of an individual
depends on whether the child turns out to be traditionalist or not. To
simplify, we will assume that the productivity of each individual is equal to
w. We limit the analysis to a small open econonomy where the productivity
of labor and the interest rate r are assumed to be constant.
Summarizing, the timing is as follows
1. At the beginning of period t, each individual has one child and γt is
set depending on the type of the individual.
2. The individual supplies inelastically one unit of labor for a unitary
wage (1− γt)w.
3. The disability of the parent is revealed. In case of disability, parent
receives µ(γt). The individual income is allocated between current
consumption ct, savings st and a premium P (It) for long term care
(LTC) insurance It.
4. In period t+ 1, the individual is old. He consumes the gross return of
his savings, (1 + r)st, where r ≥ 0 is the interest rate. If disabled, he
receives from his child µ(γt+1) and an insurance benefit equal to It.
The insurance premium is
P (It) =
λpiIt
(1 + r)
,
where λ ≥ 1 is the insurance company’s loading factor.
Individuals in each generation can be of two types, traditionalists (de-
noted by T) and moderns (denoted in the following by M).
Some comments are in order concerning the meaning of γ. In our model
γ is an investment that reduces the productivity of the young individual and
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in turn will enable him to help his parent in case of dependency. The young
adult is not interested by the benefit µ(γ) that his dependent parent will
enjoy but by the demonstration effect that such a behavior may have on his
own child. This investment in time made ex ante could be viewed as the
opportunity cost of living close to one’s parent or choosing an occupation
that makes one more available in case the parent becomes dependent. Quite
clearly such an investment is lost if the parent stays healthy and autonomous.
As said above, we also assume that the function µ(.) is strictly increasing
and concave, and that µ′(0) =∞. Compared to other types of aid (public or
private), aid from children is viewed as highly valuable, yet with decreasing
returns (hence the concavity of µ(γ)). Another interpretation could be that
wγ would correspond to some insurance premium that would provide an
income to the aiding child in case his parent becomes disabled. In that case
the premium is wγ and the compensation wγ/pi allows the child to provide
an aid of length wγ/pi.4
2.1 Traditionalist individuals’ behavior
A traditionalist young adult adopts the family norm chosen by his own
parent, namely γTt = γt−1. His expected utility function takes the form
u(cTt )+β
[
(1− pi)u(dTt ) + pi
[
ρH(mTt ) + (1− ρ)H(mTt − µ(γTt ) + µ(γMt+1))
]]
,
(1)
where cTt = (1− γTt )w− P (IT )− sTt , dTt = sTt (1 + r) and mTt = sTt (1 + r) +
ITt +µ(γ
T
t ). With probability (1− ρ) the child is modern and the individual
receives a transfer γMt+1 from his child in case of dependency. We assume
4 An alternative specification could have been that the individual provides an aid of
length γ just in case of dependency of his parent with the expectation that in case of
dependency of himself he would get γ. This specification happened to be more complex
analytically. Furthermore, such a modeling strategy would not be compatible with the
demonstration effect: only children whose grandparents were dependent would be exposed
to a family norm.
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that H(x) ≤ u(x) ∀x, that is to say that, given the consumption level,
individuals are always worse off if dependent.
The traditionalist individual will choose sTt and ITt in order to maximize
(1). The first order conditions are
u′(cTt ) = (1+r)β
[
(1− pi)u′(dTt ) + pi
[
ρH ′(mTt ) + (1− ρ)H ′(mTt − µ(γTt ) + µ(γMt+1))
]]
,
and
u′(cTt ) =
β
λ
(1 + r)
[
ρH ′(mTt ) + (1− ρ)H ′(mTt − µ(γTt ) + µ(γMt+1))
]
.
Combining those two equation one gets the following condition:(
1
λ
− pi
)[
ρH ′(mTt ) + (1− ρ)H ′(mTt − µ(γTt ) + µ(γMt+1))
]
= (1− pi)u′(dTt ).
The individual fully insures himself if and only if λ = 1. If λ > 1, insurance
is not full and the marginal utility of the individual when disabled is greater
than the marginal utility in case of good health. In particular, if λ ≥ 1/pi,
the individual buys no insurance and relies on self insurance. In the following
we assume interior solutions by considering a loading factor λ < 1/pi.
2.2 Modern individuals’ behavior
A modern young adult (denoted by M) chooses γMt , IMt and sMt in order
to maximize
u(cMt )+β
[
(1− pi)u(dMt ) + pi
[
ρH(mMt ) + (1− ρ)H(mMt − µ(γMt ) + µ(γMt+1))
]]
,
where cMt = w(1− γMt )− P (IMt )− sMt , dMt = sMt (1 + r) and mMt = sMt (1 +
r) + IMt + µ(γ
M
t ).
The first order condition with respect to γMt is
wu′(cMt ) = βρpiµ
′(γMt )H
′(mMt ). (2)
The left hand side of this condition represents the opportunity cost of the
8
family norm. The right hand side is the marginal benefit deriving from the
presence of traditionalist children that will reproduce the family norm. If
the child is modern (with probability 1 − ρ), the family norm chosen at t
will have no influence on γt+1. However, given the exogenous parameters,
the young individual at t anticipates that a modern child will face exactly
the same problem and will optimally choose γMt+1 = γMt .
The first order condition with respect to savings and LTC insurance are
respectively
u′(cMt ) = (1 + r)β
[
(1− pi)u′(dMt ) + piH ′(mMt )
]
, (3)
and
u′(cMt ) =
β
λ
(1 + r)H ′(mMt ). (4)
The interpretation is the same as for the traditionalist type.
Assuming interior solutions, combining (2) and (4) yields the following
expression
µ′(γMt ) = w
1 + r
λpiρ
, (5)
which defines implicitly the equilibrium family norm γMt (w, r, λ, pi, ρ). This
norm is constant over time, so that modern individuals in different genera-
tions will all choose the same level of family norm, γM .5 Since µ(.) is strictly
concave, γM decreases if the interest rate or the productivity increase. On
the one hand, if the interest rate increases, this makes LTC insurance and
savings a better way to transfer consumption across periods compared to the
family norm. On the other hand, an increase in productivity corresponds to
an increase in the opportunity cost of the time devoted to the family.
The family norm increases with the probability of having a traditionalist
child and the probability of being disabled. In fact, when choosing γM , mod-
ern individuals consider that this help will be productive with probability
ρpi. However, we know that the help set by the children has an impact on the
5This is due to the fact that in our small open economy, w and r are constant over
time.
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utility of the parents with probability pi. This discrepancy creates what we
call an externality here below. Note also that, if there are no traditionalist
individuals (ρ = 0), then the family norm is equal to zero.
The family norm γM is also increasing with the loading factor. If the
loading factor is very high, it becomes more interesting for the individual
to substitute the family norm, that acts as an informal insurance, for LTC
insurance. However note that, even if λ = 1, that is if LTC insurance is actu-
arially fair, the assumption µ′(0) =∞ implies that the family norm is always
positive. Intuitively, under our assumptions, the first unit of children’s help
has very high returns, exceeding the one of the insurance. For small values
of γ, assistance from children is always more valuable than assistance from
strangers.
2.3 Steady state
In the steady state, γt = γt+1 = γSS ∀t and for each dynasty.
Assume that the initial norm is γ0. In each dynasty, as soon as one
individual is modern, γ = γM (w, r, λ, pi, ρ) for all subsequent generations.
Traditionalist individuals will just reproduce γM , while modern ones face
exactly the same incentives as their first modern ancestor. After t number
of periods, the probability that at least one individual has been modern in
a given dynasty is 1 − ρt. Thus, 1 − ρt dynasties set γt = γt−1 = γM . As t
tends to infinity, (1 − ρt) tends to one and the economy reaches the steady
state, with γSS = γM .
In the following, we suppose that t is large enough so that the propor-
tion of dynasties that do not set the family norm equal to γSS is negligible.
We will denote the steady state family norm in absence of government in-
tervention γLF , with γLF = γSS = γM . Interestingly, γSS could very well
be higher than γ0. The moderns abandon the tradition and might find it
optimal to generate a higher family norm.
This point is illustrated in the Figure 1, which reports the average γt
as a function of time, under the assumptions µ(γ) = ln(γ), w = 1, r =
0.1,pi = 0.4, λ = 1.5 , and ρ = 0.7. More precisely, at each point in time, the
average family norm is equal to γ0 for all dynasties that did not experienced
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a modern generation yet, and equal to γM if at least a modern individual
belonged to the dinasty. Thus, E(γt) = ρtγ0 + (1 − ρt)γM . Under our
assumptions, γM ' 0.38. One can see that γt converges to its steady state
value, γM . Furthermore, if the initial family norm is high (γ0 = 0.6), the
family norm converges to the stady state from above. If the initial norm
is small (γ0 = 0.2), convergence takes place from below. Modern children
might lead to an increase in the level of family help.
It is worth to discuss two extreme cases. First, all individuals in the
society might be modern (ρ = 0). Then, as discussed above, the family
norm at the steady state would be equal to zero. Second, all individuals
might be traditionalist. In this case, there would be no dynamics and γ0
would be the steady state value of the family norm.
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Figure 1
3 Identical productivities
In this section we consider a population where all dynasties have the
same productivities. We first characterize the first best allocation. We then
study how the first best could be centralized by a linear income tax and a
public LTC insurance. We also analyze the second best allocation when not
all these instruments are available.
3.1 First best
In the steady state, whichever the type of the children, the consumption
in case of dependency is equal tom. The first best allocation is characterized
by the solution of the problem of an utilitarian social planner maximizing the
utility of the representative generation in the steady state under the economy
resource constraint. In doing so, the social planner takes into account the
fact that γ is only operative with probability pi.6 The first best problem is:
max
c, d,m, γ
u(c) + β[(1− pi)u(d) + piH(m)]
6Alternatively, one could analyze the case when the social planner is able to impose
a mutualization of family help. In such a case, γ is never wasted, since individuals with
healthy parents are forced to help dependent elderly not belonging to their family. This
specification would be more relevant for traditional societies with extended family. Our
model applies to nuclear families.
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s.t. c(1 + r) + (1− pi)d+ pim ≥ w(1− γ)(1 + r) + piµ(γ).
The first order conditions with respect to the consumption levels yield
the following condition
u′(cFB) = β(1 + r)u′(dFB) = β(1 + r)H ′(mFB) = (1 + r)ψ,
where ψ is the multiplier associated to the resource constraint. In the first
best, there is perfect consumption smoothing across time and states.
The first order condition with respect to γ is
w(1 + r) = piµ′(γFB)
⇐⇒ µ′(γFB) = w (1 + r)
pi
.
Comparing this expression with (5) we can compare γFB with γLF . First
remark that, in the first best, γ does not depend on ρ. The social planner
internalizes the fact that the help of modern children positively affects their
parents, so that the social benefit of γ equals piµ(γ). At the laissez faire
individuals only take into account the benefit of the family investment due
to the imitation behavior of traditionalis children. They thus internalize only
a share of the social benefit, ρpiµ(γ). It is important to note that this result
holds only if ρ is stricly greater than zero and smaller than one. If ρ = 0,
the in the steady state the family norm is equal to zero. If ρ = 1, then in
the steady state γLF = γ0, the initial family norm. In this case γFB Q γLF ,
depending on the initial value of the family norm.
Second, γFB does not depend on λ, since we assume here that the govern-
ment can transfer consumption freely across periods and states of the world.
Overall the relationship between γFB and γLF is ambiguous. Because of
the positive externally on parents, γLF tends to be too small if insurance is
actuarial fair. However, if λ > 1, LTC insurance becomes less attractive and
is substituted for by the family norm. More precisely γFB ≥ γLF if and only
if λρ ≤ 1.
Remember that ρ represents the proportion of individuals engaging in
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traditional behavior. It can be considered as a proxy for the traditionalism
of a society. Consequently, our comparison between first best and equilibrium
family norms has an easy interpretation. Societies where the loading factor
and/or traditionalism are low will display family norms that are lower than
the first best level. On the contrary, traditional societies that do not have
access to an efficient insurance market will display an excessive degree of
family help.
3.1.1 Decentralization of the first best
The first best can be decentralized by a linear income tax and a de-
mogrant if the loading factor is equal to one (λ = 1 ). In this case, the only
distortion in the laissez faire allocation comes from underprovision of γ. A
linear tax θ on individuals’ income and a lump sum transfer L decentralize
the first best. The optimal θ decentralizing the first best family norm is a
Pigouvian tax. This tax induces the individuals to internalize the impact of
the full social benefit of the family norm:
µ′(γ∗) = (1− θ∗)w (1 + r)
ρpi
= w
(1 + r)
pi
= µ′(γFB)
⇐⇒ θ∗ = 1− ρ.
The optimal lump sum transfer is L∗ = θ∗w(1−γFB), so that the disposable
income is not affected by the government intervention. As we noted before,
this result only holds if 0 < ρ < 1. If all individuals were modern, then agents
would have no private benefit from investing in family help. There would
be no use for a payroll tax. If, conversely all individuals were traditionalist,
then the family norm would be equal to γ0, and it would be impossible to
obtain the optimal level of family norm. Modern individuals are necessary
to generate some dynamics of the family norm, and are necessary to make
policy effective. Intuitively, any policy is powerless if individuals are unable
abandon a tradition.
If the loading factor is higher than one, such a system does not decen-
tralize the first best. However, the first best can be achieved if a flat-benefit
public LTC insurance is introduced. In this case, individuals pay a share θ of
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their income, receive a lump sum transfer when young and receive a transfer
B in case of dependency when old. The public LTC insurance is assumed to
be actuarially fair. The resource constraint of the social planner is thus
L ≤ θw(1− γ)− piB
(1 + r)
.
Given the tax schedule, the representative individual chooses γ∗(θ, L,B),
s∗(θ, L,B) and I∗(θ, L,B) such that the individual first order conditions are
satisfied:
(1− θ)wu′(c∗) = βρpiµ′(γ∗)H ′(m∗)
u′(c∗) = (1 + r)β
[
(1− pi)u′(d∗) + piH ′(m∗)]
λu′(c∗) ≥ β(1 + r)H ′(m∗),
where c∗ = (1 − γ∗)(1 − θ)w + L − P (I∗) − s, d∗ = s∗(1 + r) and m∗ =
s∗(1 + r) + I∗ + µ(γ∗) +B. Note that the condition on I∗ allows for corner
solutions, which may take place if the public LTC insurance crowds out the
private one. The problem of the social planner is
max
θ,L,B
u(c∗(θ, L,B)) + β [(1− pi)u(d∗(θ, L,B)) + piH(m∗(θ, L,B))]
s.t. L ≤ θw(1− γ)− piB
(1 + r)
.
Since the resource constraint is always saturated at the optimum, we can
rewrite the problem as
max
θ,B
u(c∗(θ,B)) + β [(1− pi)u(d∗(θ,B)) + piH(m∗(θ,B))]
where c∗(θ,B) = (1− γ∗)w − piB/(1 + r)− λpiI∗/(1 + r)− s∗, while d∗ and
m∗ are defined as above.
The first order conditions with respect to θ and B are
[
β(1− ρ)piH ′(m∗)µ′(γ∗)− wθu′(c∗)] ∂γ∗
∂θ
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+
[
βρpiH ′(m∗)µ′(γ∗)− w(1− θ)u′(c∗)] ∂γ∗
∂θ
+
[
(1 + r)β
(
(1− pi)u′(d∗) + piH ′(m∗))− u′(c)] ∂s∗
∂θ
+
[
βpiH ′(m∗)− λpi
(1 + r)
u′(c∗)
]
∂I∗
∂θ
= 0,
and
βpiH ′(m∗)− pi
(1 + r)
u′(c∗)
+
[
β(1− ρ)piH ′(m∗)µ′(γ∗)− wθu′(c∗)] ∂γ∗
∂B
+
[
βρpiH ′(m∗)µ′(γ∗)− w(1− θ)u′(c∗)] ∂γ∗
∂B
+
[
(1 + r)β
(
(1− pi)u′(d∗) + piH ′(m∗))− u′(c)] ∂s∗
∂B
+
[
βpiH ′(m∗)− λpi
(1 + r)
u′(c∗)
]
∂I∗
∂B
= 0.
Using the envelope theorem and observing that either βpiH ′(m) = λpiu′(c)/(1+
r), or I∗ = 0 (implying ∂I∗/∂θ = ∂I∗/∂B = 0), we can rewrite the condi-
tions above as
[
β(1− ρ)piH ′(m∗)µ′(γ∗)− wθu′(c∗)] ∂γ∗
∂θ
= 0, (6)
and
βpiH ′(m∗)− pi
(1 + r)
u′(c∗) +
[
β(1− ρ)piH ′(m∗)µ′(γ∗)− wθu′(c∗)] ∂γ∗
∂B
= 0.
(7)
Substituting (6) in (7), we get
β(1− ρ)piH ′(m∗)− wθu′(c∗) = 0,
and
βH ′(m∗)− 1
(1 + r)
u′(c∗) = 0.
Since the individual first order condition with respect to γ∗ is (1−θ)wu′(c∗) =
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βρpiµ′(γ)H ′(m∗), we can rewrite the first condition as
(1− ρ)
ρ
=
θ∗
(1− θ∗) ⇐⇒ θ
∗ = 1− ρ.
Again, the payroll tax corrects for the family norm externality.
The second condition simply states that the public LTC smooths con-
sumption across states. Public insurance is non distortionary since there tax
includes a lump-sum transfer (see Cremer and Pestieau, 2011). Note that, if
λ = 1, then public and private insurance are perfect substitutes.
3.1.2 Second best: public LTC insurance
We now study the optimal public LTC insurance scheme when the num-
ber of instruments of the social planner is limited. We assume that the
public insurance is funded either through a lump-sum tax on the young or a
proportional income tax.
First, suppose that the only instruments available to the social planner
is a transfer B to dependent individuals financed by a lump-sum tax L on
the young. Given this tax the individual chooses γ∗(L,B), s∗(L,B) and
I∗(L,B) such that the individual first order conditions are satisfied.
The problem of the social planner is now:
max
L,B
u(c∗(L,B)) + β [(1− pi)u(d∗(L,B)) + piH(m∗(L,B))]
s.t. − L ≥ piB
(1 + r)
.
Since the resource constraint is always binding, the problem can be rewritten
as
max
B
u(c∗(L,B)) + β [(1− pi)u(d∗(L,B)) + piH(m∗(L,B))] ,
where c∗ = (1 − γ∗)w − piB/(1 + r) − λpiI∗/(1 + r) − s∗, and m∗ = s∗(1 +
r) + I∗ + µ(γ∗) + B, and d∗ is defined as above. The first order condition
with respect to B, after using the envelope theorem, reduces to
[−u′(c∗) + β(1 + r)H ′(m∗)]
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+β(1− ρ)piH ′(m∗)µ′(γ∗)dγ
∗
dB
= 0, (8)
Condition (8) is easy to interpret. The first term in brackets represents
the insurance concern of the social planner. If this term is equal to zero,
insurance is full. The second term represents the family norm externality. It
is reasonable to assume that the family norm is decreasing in B, since the
public LTC insurance transfers resources from the young to the dependent.7
Consequently, the second term of (8) is always negative. For the condition to
hold, one needs [−u′(c∗) + β(1 + r)H ′(m∗)] > 0, that is to say less than full
insurance. Suppose that the social planner chooses the benefit BFI (where
FI stands for full insurance) equalizing the marginal utilities in all states of
the word. Then, from (5), we get
µ′(γFI) = w
1 + r
piρ
> µ′(γFB),
implying a family norm smaller than in the first best. Consequently, to
enhance the family norm, the social planner optimally chooses B∗ < BFI
and insurance is less than full. There is thus a trade-off between insuring
disability and correcting for the family norm externality.
Suppose now that the transfer B to dependent individuals is financed by
a payroll tax θ. Given this tax the individual chooses γ∗(θ,B), s∗(θ,B) and
I∗(θ,B) such that the individual first order conditions are satisfied.
The problem of the social planner is now:
max
θ,B
u(c∗(θ,B)) + β [(1− pi)u(d∗(θ,B)) + piH(m∗(θ,B))]
s.t. wθ(1− γ) ≥ piB
(1 + r)
.
Since the resource constraint is always binding, the problem can be rewritten
as
max
θ,B
u(c∗(θ,B)) + β [(1− pi)u(d∗(θ,B)) + piH(m∗(θ,B))] ,
7This is not necessarily true, since the public LTC insurance also discourage savings,
and savings and family norm are substitutes.
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where c∗ = (1− γ∗)(1− θ)w− λpiI∗/(1+ r)− s∗, and m∗ = s∗(1+ r) + I∗+
µ(γ∗) + wθ(1− γ)(1 + r)/pi, and d∗ is defined as above.
The first order condition with respect to θ, after using the envelope the-
orem, reduces to
w(1− γ∗) [−u′(c∗) + β(1 + r)H ′(m∗)]
+βpiH ′(m∗)
[
(1− ρ)µ′(γ∗)− θw (1 + r)
pi
]
dγ∗
dθ
= 0. (9)
The first term represents the insurance motive of the social planner. This
term is positive whenever there is less than full insurance. The second term
represents the family norm externality. Its sign is ambigous since dγ/dθ
might be either positive or negative. On the one hand, the tax reduces
the opportunity cost of investing in family help. On the other hand the tax
reduces the disposable income of young individuals and reduces the marginal
benefit of family help received in the old age. Overall, it is not clear which
effect dominates. Two cases might arise. If the public LTC insurance does
not crowd out the private one, then equation (4) holds, and the family norm
is implicitely given by condition (5). In this case, dγ/dθ > 0. Conversely, if
the public LTC insurance crowds out the private one, γ is given by (2), and
dγ/dθ R 0.
To get some intuitition, let us define θFI as the tax decentralizing full
insurance. Given this tax, the steady state family norm is such that
µ′(γFI) = w(1− θFI)(1 + r)
ρpi
.
Thus, the left hand side of first order condition (9) evaluated in θFI , is equal
to βpiH ′(m∗) [(1− ρ)µ′(γ∗)− θw(1 + r)/pi] (dγ∗/dθ), which is equal to zero
if and only if θFI = (1− ρ). This is not in general true.
First consider the case where θFI > (1−ρ). In this case, the family norm
γFI is too high with respect to the first best, and
[
(1− ρ)µ′(γFI)− θFIw(1 + r)/pi]
is negative. If dγ/dθ > 0, then the sign of the left hand side of (9) is negative,
so that the optimal θ is smaller than θFI . Consequently, the social planner
19
gives up some insurance in order to reduce the family norm. Conversely, if
dγ/dθ < 0, the left hand side of the equation is positive, so that the optimal
θ is greater than θFI . In this case the social planner insures individuals more
than fully, in order to keep down the family norm.
If θFI < (1− ρ), we can use a similar reasoning. The equilibrium family
norm is too small. If dγ/dθ > 0, the social planner overinsures individuals in
order to sustain the family norm. If dγ/dθ < 0, the social planner provides
less than full coverage.
Finally, remark that θ∗ > 0. Suppose this was not true. The public LTC
insurance would consist of a transfer from the dependent to the young, and
there would be no crowding out of private insurance. Then, insurance would
be less than full and the first term of (9) would be positive. Since equation
(5) holds, dγ/dθ > 0. Then the left hand side of the above expression would
be positive, which contradicts θ∗ < 0 being optimal.
4 Heterogeneous productivities
We now turn to the case of dynasties characterized by different produc-
tivities. We assume that there is a finite number n of productivity types
in the population. A particular productivity type is denoted by wi, with
i = 1, 2, ..., n, and w1 < w2 < ... < wn. Each productivity level wi occurs
with probability pi. Moreover,
∑n
i=1 pi = 1. Individuals in the same dynasty
have the same productivities.
In the steady state, an individual of type i has a family norm γi =
γ(wi, .). Furthermore, equation (5) implies that ∂γ/∂w ≤ 0. More produc-
tive individuals have a lower family norm, since their opportunity cost of
devoting time to the family is higher. In the appendix we show that sav-
ings increase with w, while it is not possible to sign the derivative of private
insurance purchases with respect to w.
4.1 First best
The problem of an utilitarian social planner to maximize the sum of
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individual utilities in the steady steady state:
max
ci, di,mi, γi
Ew {u(c) + β[(1− pi)u(d) + piH(m)]}
s.t. Ew {c(1 + r) + (1− pi)d+ pim− γw(1 + r) + piµ(γ)} ≥ Ew[w],
where Ew[u(w)] =
∑n
i=1 piu(wi). The first order conditions with respect to
the consumption levels yield the following conditions:
u′(cFBi ) = β(1 + r)u
′(dFBi ) = β(1 + r)H
′(mFBi ) = (1 + r)ψ ∀i, (10)
where ψ is the multiplier associated with the resource constraint. These
conditions imply that cFBi = c
FB, dFBi = d
FBand mFBi = m
FB. In the
first best, the allocation is characterized by perfect consumption smoothing
across productivities.
The first order condition with respect to the family norm can be written
as
wiu
′(cFB) = βpiµ′(γFBi )H
′(mFB).
Combining this condition with (10) one gets
µ′(γFBi ) = wi
(1 + r)
pi
,
implying that more productive individuals should set a smaller family norm,
since it is more efficient for them to devote time to labor activities. In
the first best thus, the optimal family norm decreases with the individual
productivity, while consumption levels are uniform across types.
4.2 Second best: linear income tax
Consider now a situation where the social planner can only use a linear
tax. She collects a fraction θ of individuals’ income an redistribute the
tax revenue through a lump sum transfer L. Given this tax schedule, each
individual i optimally chooses γ∗i (θ, L), s
∗
i (θ, L) and I
∗
i (θ, L).
The problem of the social planner is
21
max
θ,T
Ew {u(c∗(θ, L)) + β[(1− pi)u(d∗(θ, L)) + piH(m∗(θ, L))]}
s.t. L ≤ Ew [w(1− γ∗)θ] .
Since the budget constraint is binding at the optimal allocation one can
replace L with Ew [w(1− γ)θ] in the problem and maximize with respect to
θ only. The first order condition with respect to θ, is equal to
Ew
{−w(1− γ∗)u′(c∗) + Ew [w(1− γ∗)]u′(c∗)}
+Ew
{
β(1− ρ)piµ′(γ)H ′(m∗)dγ
∗
dθ
− Ew
[
wθ
dγ
dθ
]
u′(c)
}
= 0.
After manipulations the first order condition with respect to θ can be written
as
θ∗ =
−Covw [u′, (1− γ∗)w] + β(1− ρ)Ew
[
µ′H ′ dγ
∗
dθ
]
Ew [wu′]Ew
[
dγ∗
dθ
] > 0. (11)
In setting the tax the social planner takes into account not only the usual
trade-off between redistribution (first term of the numerator) and efficiency
(denominator), but also the family norm externality (second term of the
numerator). Since the level of γ is suboptimal in the laissez faire, the social
planner will set a greater tax than the one she would choose in the absence
of family norms. The tax reduces labor wages and consequently enhances
the time devoted to family help. Note also that the tax cannot correct for
the lack of full insurance due to the loading factor. If public insurance is not
available, then the social planner cannot improve on the individual insurance
choices I∗.
4.3 Second best: payroll tax and public LTC insurance.
We now characterize the optimal public LTC insurance when individuals
are heterogeneous. We consider a setting where individuals pay a share θ of
their income, and receive a transfer B in case of dependency in the old age.
The public LTC insurance is assumed to be actuarially fair. The resource
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constraint of the social planner is thus
Ew [θw(1− γ)] ≥ piB
(1 + r)
.
Given the tax schedule, each individual i optimally chooses γ∗i (θ,B), s
∗
i (θ,B)
and I∗i (θ,B). Note that the first order condition with respect to I,(4), al-
lows for corner solutions, which may take place if the public LTC insurance
entirely crowds our the private one. In particular, starting at B = 0, I∗i
decreases in B, and I∗i = 0 if
λu′(c∗i ) > β(1 + r)H
′(m∗i ).
If I∗ > 0, then γ is implicitely defined by (5) and does not depend on the
transfer B. If I∗ = 0, however, the level of the family norm might be affected
by such a transfer. The problem of the social planner is
max
θ,L,τ
Ew {u(c∗) + β[(1− pi)u(d∗) + piH(m∗)]}
s.t. Ew [θw(1− γ∗)] ≥ piB
(1 + r)
.
The Lagrange expression for the planning problem is
L = Ew {u(c∗) + β[(1− pi)u(d∗) + piH(m∗)]}−ψ
{
−Ew [θw(1− γ∗)] + piB
(1 + r)
}
,
where ψ ≥ 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the revenue con-
straint. The first order conditions with respect to θ and B yield
∂L
∂θ
= Ew
[
−w(1− γ∗)u′(c∗) + β(1− ρ)piµ′(γ∗)H ′(m∗)∂γ
∗
∂θ
]
−ψEw
[
wθ
∂γ∗
∂θ
− w(1− γ∗)
]
= 0, (12)
and
∂L
∂B
= Ew
[
βpiH ′(m∗) + β(1− ρ)piµ′(γ∗)H ′(m∗)∂γ
∗
∂B
]
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−ψEw
[
pi
(1 + r)
+ wθ
∂γ∗
∂B
]
= 0. (13)
Using the above first-order conditions, we can write
∂L˜
∂θ
≡ ∂L
∂θ
+
∂L
∂θ
∂θ
∂B
= 0, (14)
where ∂B/∂θ = (1 + r)Ew [w(1− γ∗)] /pi is obtained from the resource con-
straint of the government. We define
∂γC
∂θ
≡ ∂γ
∗
∂θ
+
∂γ∗
∂B
∂B
∂θ
.
The sign of ∂γc/∂θ is ambiguous whenever the public insurance crowds out
the private one. Combining (12) and (13), we can rewrite (14) as
∂L˜
∂θ
= Ew
[
−w(1− γ∗)u′(c∗) + βpiH ′(m∗)β(1− ρ)piµ′(γ∗)H ′(m∗)∂γ
C
∂θ
]
+Ew
[
β(1− r)H ′(m∗)]Ew [w(1− γ∗)]− ψEw [wθ∂γC
∂θ
]
= 0.
After manipulations we obtain the following conditon for the optimal θ.
θ∗ =
−Covw [u′, (1− γ∗)w] + Ew [β(1− r)H ′ − u′] + β(1− ρ)Ew
[
µ′H ′ ∂γ
C
∂θ
]
ψEw
[
w ∂γ
C
∂θ
] .
(15)
When setting the tax the social planner takes into account not only the
the usual trade-off between redistribution (first term of the numerator) and
efficiency (denominator), but also the insurance motive and the family norm
externality (second and third term of the numerator). With respect to the
formula in (11), the optimal tax here also depends on an insurance term: the
social planner can affect the level of insurance through B.
It can be easily shown that θ∗ > 0. Assume this was not true. In this
case, the government would make a transfer from disabled individuals to
the young (and more intensively to the high-income young). In this case,
24
no crowding out of the private LTC insurance takes place and (5) holds, so
that ∂γc/∂θ > 0 for each individuals. Furthermore, insurance would not be
full and [β(1− r)H ′ − u′] > 0. Thus the right hand side of (15) is positive,
which is a contradiction with θ∗ < 0.
Note that, in the absence of a demogrant, the public insurance plays
a redistributive role. If a demogrant was available, B would have no re-
distributive role. In addition to that, if λ = 1, a demogrant would ensure
redistribution and the public LTC insurance would be a redundant instru-
ment.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to analyze a particular example of caring
initiative taken by children to the benefit of their aged and disabled parents.
The motivation of children is not altruism but the hope that their caring
behavior will influence their own children in doing the same if later they
also need help. The caring initiative we have in mind is an investment or
a decision that is made before the occurrence of disability. This can be a
particular residential location, an occupational choice or some type of train-
ing that can be highly useful in case parents become disabled. If parents
remain healthy those investments are of little value and can be treated as
sunk costs. Besides the uncertainty over disability there is a second uncer-
tainty that concerns the tradition-abiding behavior of children. Indeed we
can realistically expect that a fraction of children will not follow the example
of their parents in making such caring decision. In addition to this ex ante
investment, individuals can provide for their old days, disabled or not, by
saving and by buying a private LTC insurance.
Given this setting, we first look at the case where all individuals are
alike ex ante. We show that the laissez faire solution is not optimal because
in making their decisions individuals neglect the future actions of the non-
traditional children. This calls for a Pigovian instrument. If the private
LTC insurance is not actuarially fair, we show that a linear tax and a public
LTC insurance decentralize the first best. If the social planner can only
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rely on a public LTC insurance (funded through a lump-sum transfer or
a proportional linear tax), then it is not possible to decentralize the first
best. There is a trade-off between providing adequate insurance coverage
and giving incentives for family help.
Then, we turn to the case where individuals differ in earnings. The role
of the government in this case is to correct for the above externality but also
to redistribute resources. We consider a number of instruments: a linear
income tax, and a flat-benefit LTC social benefit. We obtain the second
best values of these instruments. Not surprisingly, the optimality of social
insurance depends on the loading costs. The payroll tax plays a double role:
it finances public LTC expenditures but it is also a subsidy on the caring
investment.
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Appendix: comparative statics with respect to w.
Equation (5) permits us to recover ∂γ/∂w = ((1 + r)/λρpi) /µ′′(γ) < 0.
Total derivation of (3) and (4) yields
∂I
∂w
UsI +
∂s
∂w
Uss = 0
∂I
∂w
UII +
∂s
∂w
UIs = 0
In order to solve this system, define
A ≡
[
UII UIs
UsI Uss
]
=
[
βpiH ′′(m) + (λpi)2u′′(c)/(1 + r)2 βpi(1 + r)H ′′(m) + λpiu′′(c)/(1 + r)
βpi(1 + r)H ′′(m) + λpiu′′(c)/(1 + r) (1 + r)2β [(1− pi)u′′(d) + piH ′′(m)] + u′′(c)
]
,
and
B ≡
[
−∂UI∂w
−∂Us∂w
]
=
[
(1− γ) piλ(1+r)u′′(c)− w ∂γ∂w piλ(1+r)u′′(c)− βpiH ′′(m)µ′(γ) ∂γ∂w
(1− γ)u′′(c)− w ∂γ∂wu′′(c)− βpi(1 + r)H ′′(m)µ′(γ) ∂γ∂w
]
.
Using this notation, we can write
∂I
∂w
=
det
[
−∂UI∂w UIs
−∂Us∂w Uss
]
det [A]
and
∂s
∂w
=
det
[
UII − ∂I∂w
UsI − ∂s∂w
]
det [A]
.
Straightforward calculations yield (under the assumption that λpi < 1)
det [A] = β2pi(1− pi)(1 + r)2H ′′(m)u′′(d) + βpiH ′′(m)u′′(c)
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+ βλ2pi2(1− pi)u′′(c)u′′(d) + βλpi2(2 + λpi)u′′(c)H ′′(m) > 0,
det
[
−∂UI∂w UIs
−∂Us∂w Uss
]
= βλpi(1 + r)(1− pi)(1− γ)u′′(c)u′′(d)− βλpi(1− pi)(1 + r)w ∂γ
∂w
u′′(c)u′′(d)
− β2pi(1− pi)(1 + r)2µ′(γ) ∂γ
∂w
H ′′(m)u′′(d)
+ βpiu′′(c)H ′′(m) (λpi − 1)
(
(1 + r)(1− γ)− (1 + r)w ∂γ
∂w
+ µ′(γ)
∂γ
∂w
)
≶ 0.
and
det
[
UII − ∂I∂w
UsI − ∂s∂w
]
> 0
.
Thus, savings increase in the productivity parameter, while the sign of
∂I/∂w is ambigous.
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